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Sugden: The Southern Indians In The War of 1812: The Closing Phase

THE SOUTHERN INDIANS IN THE WAR OF
1812: THE CLOSING PHASE
by JOHN SUGDEN

has been conventional to equate the conflict between the
Isouthern
Indians and the United States during the War of
T

1812 with the Creek war of 1813-1814. More correctly, however,
there were three stages of the fighting, each emanating from
standing grievances against the Americans nursed by Creek and
Seminole bands, but receiving their initial impetus from
separate sources. In 1812 and 1813, the Seminoles and their
Negro allies, rallied by the Spanish who were concerned to
protect their possessions in the south from American filibusters,
participated in a number of skirmishes. A second phase of Indian
hostility to the Americans, and that most widely known, was
ignited primarily by the admonitions of Tecumseh and his
followers from 1811 to 1814. The fighting of the so-called Creek
War commenced with an engagement at Burnt Corn in the
summer of 1813, and lasted until the American victory at Horseshoe Bend in March 1814. Within a few months of their defeat,
however, the Indians were reinvigorated by the arrival of British
forces in Florida, and the cooperation of the dissident natives
with the British forms the closing stage of the conflict. To the
collapse of this relationship, consummated by a British failure
to uphold those clauses in the Treaty of Ghent which protected
the Indians, a subsequent exchange between Indians and
Americans, the Seminole war of 1818 acted as a finale, but
this last lies outside the scope of the present article.
A clarification of the Indian resistance to the United States
in the south during the closing phase of the conflict is here
intended. Several previous examinations of this area have been
published, but the emphasis of this study, as far as possible, has
been upon the Indian viewpoint. However, since the natives
left no written records, it necessarily is inferred from the reJohn Sugden is lecturer and research officer at Hereward College,
Coventry, and is completing his doctorate at the University of Sheffield,
England.
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ports of their British allies. 1 The episode is best interpreted as
part of the last, and the largest, of several desperate attempts
made by the Indians of the eastern woodlands to arrest the social
disintegration, cultural decay, depopulation, and loss of land
occasioned by their protracted contact with the white frontier.
A militant pan-Indian nativist movement, led by Tecumseh and
Tenskwatawa, two Shawnees, developed in the northwest in the
years preceding the War of 1812. Assisted by the outbreak of
fighting between England and the United States, it eventually
swept in some of the southern Indians, those who rose against
the Americans in the Creek war. This movement was defeated
in the north at Moraviantown in 1813, and in the south at
Horseshoe Bend in 1814, but in neither theatre was it completely
crushed.
In the summer of 1814 British forces arrived in the south to
fortify the remaining Indian dissidents and to supply them with
arms and provisions. The Indians welcomed the British as
stronger and more steadfast allies than were the Spaniards, their
immediate wants were relieved, and there were prospects of
driving back the enemy and regaining their lands. Moreover,
while many tribesmen in the south refused to commit themselves
to war against the United States so long as the Americans retained the military ascendancy, the harsh policies of Andrew
Jackson strengthened the hostile nativist faction. Nevertheless,
the British invasion failed, and Indian hopes rested upon the
Treaty of Ghent of 1814 which invalidated the dispossession of
the Creeks by the Treaty of Fort Jackson signed earlier that
year. But the Americans continued to uphold the Fort Jackson
agreement, and the Indians were unable to persuade the British
1.

Mark F. Boyd, “Events at Prospect Bluff on the Apalachicola River, 18081818,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XVI (October 1937), 55-96; John K.
Mahon, “British Strategy and the Southern Indians: War of 1812,”
Florida Historical Quarterly, XLIV (April 1966), 285-302; John K.
Mahon, The War of 1812 (Gainesville, 1972); Frank L. Owsley, Jr.,
“British and Indian Activities in Spanish West Florida During the War
of 1812,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XLVI (October 1967), 111-23. A
sound appreciation of the Indian position is evidenced by J. Leitch
Wright, Jr., “A Note on The First Seminole War as Seen by the
Indians, Negroes and their British Advisors,” Journal of Southern
History, XXXIV (November 1968), 565-75, and in his books, AngloSpanish Rivalry in North America (Athens, 1971), Britain and the
American Frontier, 1783-1815 (Athens, 1975), and The Only Land They
Knew, The Tragic Story of the American Indians in the Old South (New
York, 1981).

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol60/iss3/3

2

Sugden: The Southern Indians In The War of 1812: The Closing Phase
SOUTHERN INDIANS IN THE WAR

OF

1812

275

to take up their cause as an infringement of an international
treaty. Without that support the nativist movement in the south
was powerless to contest further American aggression and the
stage was prepared for the Indian removals of the ensuing
decades.
Both of the principal Indian groups actively in opposition to
the Americans at the time of the British invasion of the south
in 1814 had been involved in the earlier conflict with the United
States. One, the Seminole, had probably heard of Tecumseh’s
inflammatory talk to the Creeks in 1811, and according to tribal
tradition two of the influential Seminole chiefs, Ben Berryman
and Cappachamico, had been among those who heard the
Shawnee at Tuckabatchee.2 But whatever support Tecumseh
might have reaped for his inter-tribal confederacy among the
Seminoles and their Negro allies, a more potent influence was
that of the Spanish. Spain, at this time, controlled the Florida
peninsula and a strip of land south of the thirty-first parallel
running westwards along the Gulf to the Mississippi. Between
1810 and 18 13, however, Georgians and Tennesseans, supported
cautiously by the American government and aware of internal
unrest among the Spaniards, managed to wrest Baton Rouge,
the area west of the Perdido, Mobile, and Amelia Island from
Spain. To secure his country’s possessions from further aggression
the Spanish governor, Sebastián Kindelan, incited the Seminoles and Negroes against the American interlopers in 1812.
Many of the Negroes were refugees from American plantations
who had found considerable freedom and status among the
Seminoles; they particularly feared the increase of American
interference in Florida. Furthermore, the destruction of some
Indian towns by American forces in 1813 gave additional cause
for Seminole hostility towards the United States.3
The other major Indian opponents of the Americans were
the “Red Stick” Creeks of Alabama. Their resentment had been
long brewing. Creek society had been fraught with excessive
2. A. W. Crain to Lyman C. Draper, January 11, 1882, Draper Collection
Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, Vol. 4, YY, 16.
3. The best studies of this conflict are Rembert W. Patrick, Florida
Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border, 1810-1815
(Athens, 1954); Edwin C. McReynolds, The Seminoles (Norman, Oklahoma, 1957). See also Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (New York,
1949), 60-125, 189-237.
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interference from the United States since the Treaty of Coleraine
in 1796. Benjamin Hawkins, the American agent, tried to
dominate the Creek National Council, to which delegates from
all the Creek towns were invited. He also wanted to centralize
Indian society by issuing certificates to Creeks intending to
hunt or trade, testifying to their reliability. By the administration of public order rather than the allowance of its management to the clan, town, or individual, Hawkins also contributed
towards this trend. Further, he encouraged agricultural development and production for the market. His efforts tended to promote the settlement of the Indians outside of the villages, away
from the communal influences, and the development of ownership of private property and individualism. Many of the
traditional Creek villages went into decline, some of the land
was exhausted, and the sense of communal responsibility among
the Indians was eroded.4
A schism rapidly appeared in Creek society. The so-called
“progressive” faction, strong among the Lower Creeks of the
Chattahoochee, Flint, and Ocmulgee rivers, adhered more
strongly to the American program; the nativist or Red Stick
Creeks, prevalent among the more remote Upper Creeks of
central Alabama, espoused tribal independence and a separate
cultural identity. The anger of the Red Stick Creeks against
the Americans was enhanced by incursions onto Indian lands.
Not only were the Spaniards being pressed in the south by the
United States, but the newly organized Louisiana Territory,
the growth of American settlements along the Cumberland River,
and the perennial expansion attempts by Georgians, created
among the Indians the feeling that they were being encircled
by the United States and that such activity would lead to
4. For the Creek war, see R. S. Cotterill, The Southern Indians: The
Story of the Civilized Tribes Before Removal (Norman, 1954), 146-93;
McReynolds, Seminoles, 52-62; Angie Debo, The Road to Disappearance
(Norman, 1941), 66-83; Merritt Bloodworth Pound, Benjamin Hawkins,
Indian Agent (Athens, 1951); Frank L. Owsley, “Benjamin Hawkins, the
First Modern Indian Agent,” Alabama Historical Quarterly, XXX
(Summer 1968), 7-13; H. S. Halbert and T. H. Ball, The Creek War of
1813 and 1814 (University, Alabama, 1969); Frank Herman Akers, The
Unexpected Challenge: The Creek War of 1813-14 (Ph.D. dissertation,
Duke University, 1975); John Spencer Bassett, ed., Correspondence of
Andrew Jackson, 6 vols. (Washington, D. C., 1926-35), I, II; Theron A.
Nunez, “Creek Nativism and the Creek War of 1813-14,” Ethnohistory,
V (winter, Spring, Summer 1958), 1-47, 131-75, 292-301.
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exorbitant demands for Indian land. Tracts on the Georgia
frontier, along the Ocmulgee and the Oconee, were ceded to the
United States by the Creeks in 1802 and 1805, and a horse
path was blazed across Indian territory between the Ocmulgee
River and Mobile. In 1811, the Americans peremptorily demanded that the Creeks allow a north-south road to pass through
their lands to connect white settlements on the Tennessee River
with Fort Stoddert near Mobile.
This was the situation into which Tecumseh, in 1811, introduced his call for the tribes to unite, to reassert traditional
Indian values and culture, and to resist further territorial encroachment by the Americans. Before the close of 1812, the Red
Sticks had developed a militant, anti-American nucleus of
warriors who looked to Tecumseh for leadership and who were
able to increase their influence among the Creeks. In 1813 a
civil war between the Red Stick and Americanized Creeks broke
out, which in the summer escalated into a confrontation between
the nativists and the Americans. The fighting ended with
Jackson’s victory over the Red Sticks at Horseshoe Bend and the
cession of some 23,000,000 acres of Creek land to the United
States at the Treaty of Fort Jackson on August 9, 1814.
The defeated Red Sticks made their way into Pensacola where
the Spanish afforded them a refuge. There they heard of the Fort
Jackson treaty and their anger increased. The terms were imposed upon Red Sticks and friendly Creeks alike, and without
the representation of the former, whose presence, no doubt,
was considered unnecessary. About half of the Creek territory
was ceded in reparation to the United States and no payment
was to be made for it. Later, in 1817 and 1853, $195,417.90 was
given to the friendly Creeks as compensation for the damage
done them by the Red Sticks but during the forty years following the annexation, the United States Treasury realized over
$11,250,000 from the land.5 Naturally, the Red Sticks repudiated
the cession immediately and it served to alienate some Creeks,
such as the Big Warrior, who had been friendly to the United
States.
It is difficult to estimate how many Red Sticks survived the
war of 1813-1814. Various assessments of the size of the Creek
nation, and the census of 1832, when the population may have
5.

Debo, Road to Disappearance, 83.
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recovered, would indicate that the tribe consisted of some
25,000 people. At the most there were about 5,000 warriors.6
More than half, perhaps sixty per cent of these, went over to the
Red Sticks during the conflict. 7 Many, undoubtedly, were lost
in the fighting although the casualties ascribed to the hostiles by
American commanders during the campaigns were grossly inflated.8 Hundreds of them managed to escape to the south, reportedly those from eight towns. In June 1814 some 200 warriors
were believed to be at Pensacola and about 1,500 more were reportedly on the Escambia River. 9 British reports indicated that
about 800 warriors eventually gathered about Pensacola and that
1,300 others remained on the Alabama as “prisoners of war,” although this last figure is likely not very accurate.10 It seems, however, that in the late summer of 1814 perhaps as many as 1,000
warriors who had resisted the American forces remained at large
as potential enemies of the United States. Among those at
liberty were some of the most implacable of the Red Stick
leaders. A number of the principal hostile chiefs, such as High
Head Jim, had been killed, and others, among them Menawa
and Paddy Walsh, were in hiding. Some, such as William
Weatherford, whom British reports suggest later fought for the
Americans against his former colleagues at Pensacola, had
surrendered.11 But two of the most influential Red Sticks remained prepared to resume the conflict, Peter McQueen and
Josiah Francis (Hillis Hadjo), both of whom had been fomentors
of the rebellion.
Both men had a history of antagonism to the United States.
Francis, the son of an Englishman and a Creek, was a leader of
the Tuskegee Creeks and had risen to prominence as a prophet
ministering the revitalization cult introduced by Tecumseh.
Early in 1813, he had been in contact with the Spanish, and
6. Ibid., 103; Mary Jane McDaniel, Relations Between the Creek Indians,
Georgia and the United States (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Mississippi, 1971), 2-3.
7. Akers, Unexpected Challenge, 137.
8. The British estimate of 1,800 warriors killed was also too high. “Return
of the Muscogee or Creek Indians,” War Office, Public Records Office,
London (hereinafter cited as WO), class 1/folio 143/pp. 174-75.
9. Cotterill, Southern Indians, 190; Harry Toulmin to Andrew Jackson,
June 22, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 9-11.
10. “Return of the Muscogee or Creek Indians,” WO/1/143/174-75.
11. Unsigned letter from Pensacola, July 19, 1814, Cochrane Papers, National
Library of Scotland, Edinburgh (hereinafter cited as CP), 2328, 32.
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in the summer he may have accompanied the expedition to
Pensacola which led to the first skirmish of the Creek war at
Burnt Corn. 12 His movements, thereafter, are obscure and
controversial. It has been asserted that at the time of the attack
on Fort Mims in August 1813, he led a party against Fort Sinquefield, or that he was busy establishing his Indian town known as
the “Holy Ground.“13 However, according to Edward Nicolls, a
British agent who knew the chief well, “Frances told me that
while he was attacking Fort Mims the blacks were the first in,
and I have one man who killed seven Americans in that affair.“14
McQueen, probably the son of James McQueen, a Scots
frontiersman, was a leader of the Tallahassee Upper Creek band
and had been present at the Creek victories at Burnt Corn and
Fort Mims. According to Nicolls, he and Francis led the Creeks,
who, in a three-day battle on January 2426, 1814, turned
Jackson’s army back to Fort Strother, and who, with eighty
warriors, defeated General John Floyd’s superior force at Calabee
Creek on January 27, 1814. Both chiefs fled to Pensacola after
the defeat at Horseshoe Bend: McQueen escaped after he was
captured on the Tallapoosa in April.15
At Pensacola the Indians depended upon help from the
Spanish. By the middle of 1813 there were only about 500
Spanish troops in West Florida, and Spain, locked in combat
with the French in Europe, was unable to send them any substantial reinforcement. Confronted with the obvious American
threat, Juan Ruiz Apodaca, captain general of Cuba, and Mateo
González Manrique, the governor of Pensacola, were ready to
arm the Indians and provision them in case they would be needed
to bolster the weak Spanish defenses.
Another possible source of support for the Red Sticks was
the British. As early as the previous September and November,
the Indians had appealed through Governor Charles Cameron,
at New Providence in the Bahamas, for assistance, suggesting
that contact might be made through the Apalachicola River. Not
12. Halbert and Ball, Creek War of 1813 and 1814, 125.
13. Ibid., 184; Nunez, “Creek Nativism,” 168.
14. Edward Nicolls to Alexander Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 5962; see also Nicolls to John Philip Morier, September 25, 1815, WO/1/
143/137-39.
15. George Stiggins, a Creek half breed, is in error in suggesting that
Francis fled to Pensacola after the destruction of his town in December 1813. Nunez, “Creek Nativism,” 172-73.
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until early in 1814, however, did Earl Bathurst, secretary of state
for war in London, give instructions to the British navy to
support the Creeks. 16 The delay caused the Indians to despair,
but their defeat in March, the loss of their fields and homes, and
the appalling material conditions in which they were compelled
to cluster about Pensacola merely accentuated their need for
the British. Red Stick resentment of the United States was also
growing. “Our Case is really miserable and lamentable,” they
told the British who eventually arrived at Apalachicola, “driven
from House and Home without Food and Clothes to cover our
Bodies by disasters and an Enemy, who has sworn our ruin, and
hovering about Pensacola and its Vicinity, where We can get
now [sic] Assistance, as the Spanish Government tells Us that
it is scarsely [sic] able to support its Own Troops.” Nevertheless,
they “have Determined to make no Peace with the United States
of America without the British Government’s Consent.“17 The
same truculent attitude was forcibly put to Benjamin Hawkins,
the American Indian agent: “We have lost our country and retreated to the sea side, where we will fight till we are all destroyed.“18
Both the Seminoles and the Red Stick Creeks, despite their
defeat in an unequal contest with the United States, were spoiling to renew the fighting, and the British were willing to oblige
them. In Europe the war with France was drawing to a triumphant close, and an able admiral, Alexander Cochrane, had
been appointed commander in chief of the American station to
coordinate a campaign against the United States seaboard.
Cochrane, as well as his predecessor, Admiral John Borlase
Warren, had been aware of the possibilities of using southern
Negroes and Indians in the subjugation of the American south,
and he now moved quickly to respond to Bathurst’s instructions.19 A British expeditionary force was sent to assist the
Indians.
Captain Hugh Pigot, of the frigate Orpheus, was employed
to make the first contact. He was given a message from Cochrane
16. Mahon, War of 1812, 341; Owsley, “British and Indian Activities,”
111-15; Earl Bathurst to Charles Cameron, March 30, 1814, CP, 2338, 34.
17. Joshua Francis, Yahollasaptko, Hopoyhisihlyholla to British Commander at St. George’s Island, June 9, 1814, CP, 2328, 28-29.
18. Debo, Road to Disappearance, 82.
19. Wright, Britain and the American Frontier, 162-65; Cochrane to George,
Earl Spencer, March 13, 1797, CP, 2568, 49-50.
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to the Indian chiefs and carried blankets and other presents,
supplied by Governor Cameron, together with 2,000 muskets
and ammunition. Accompanied by Lieutenant David Hope of the
Shelbourne, Pigot sailed for Apalachicola Bay, and anchored there
on May 11, 1814. He landed his acting lieutenant of Royal
Marines, George Woodbine, who had been given the shore
rank of brevet captain of marines and a provisional appointment as British agent to the southern Indians. Woodbine quickly
induced some Indians aboard the British vessels on May 20. The
following day Corporal James Denny and Sergeant Samuel
Smith of the marines were set ashore to instruct the warriors
in the use of small arms. A loghouse was erected upon Vincent
Island, stores were landed, and ammunition distributed.20
The base was then extended up the Apalachicola River. On
May 25, Woodbine reached Prospect Bluff, where he accepted
from the local Indians power to direct operations. He urged
them to spare the lives of any American prisoners in the forthcoming campaigns. A start was made upon erecting a fort with
a powder magazine. Since provisions for the Indians, including
flour and red paint, were inadequate, an important feature of the
bluff was the existence there of the trading store belonging to
John Forbes and Company of Pensacola. It was eventually seized,
and its caretakers, Edmund Doyle and William Hambly, entered
Woodbine’s service as interpreters. Nevertheless, there were
neither field pieces nor the supplies necessary to begin an
offensive against Fort Mitchell, eighty miles upriver, and the
Indian parties had to be content for some time with their capture
of one Wilson, an American “spy.“21
Predictably, the advent of the British was welcomed, particularly by three groups, the Seminoles, the Red Stick Creeks,
and many of the Negroes. The Indians and Negroes who first
rallied around Woodbine were mainly Seminoles, under the old
chief Thomas Perryman, and Cappachamico, head of the Mikasuki Seminole band. The chiefs were pleased to support the
20. Hugh Pigot, April 13, 1814, CP, 2328, 1-2; Pigot to George Woodbine,
May 10, 1814, ibid., 3-6; Pigot to James Denny and Samuel Smith, May
21, 1814, ibid., 9; Pigot to Cochrane, June 8, 1814, Admiralty Papers,
Public Record office, London (hereinafter cited as ADM), class
1/folio 506/pp. 394-99.
21. Woodbine to Pigot, May 25, 1814, CP, 2328, 14-15; Boyd, “Events at
Prospect Bluff,” 74-75; Woodbine to David Hope, May 31, 1814, CP, 2328,
13.

Published by STARS, 1981

9

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 60 [1981], No. 3, Art. 3
282

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL QUARTERLY

campaign against the Americans. The hostility of the Seminoles
to the United States, as well as the attraction of British presents,
arms, and provisions, guaranteed immediate support for
Woodbine. The agent was also aware of the recalcitrant Red
Sticks, who, destitute and unarmed, sheltered about Pensacola.
They were unable apparently to obtain supplies from either
the Spaniards or John Forbes and Company, the Indian traders.
Consequently, a young warrior called Yellow Hair was dispatched
by Woodbine to Pensacola to carry the news of the, British
landing to the followers of Francis and McQueen. There was an
immediate response. McQueen, with twenty-five men, left for
Apalachicola by boat. Durgan with a party of twenty, and other
groups, followed shortly afterwards. Francis found passage to
Apalachicola on a British schooner, and as word spread, numbers
of Negroes fled from American plantations to join the British
standard. 22
An estimate of the Indian forces in alliance with the British
at this time reveals the continued hostility of the Seminole and
Red Stick bands to the United States. Woodbine assessed his
support from villages along the upper Apalachicola River as:
Yawolla, ten warriors; Tamathea or Tamathla and Ochesee, 150;
Tochtohuli, 100; Oaketee Ockanee, 250; Saockulo, fifty; Fowltown, 300; Euchee, twenty; Tallasee, thirty; Canholva, fifteen;
and Emasee, fifty, for a total of 975 warriors. To these were added
the men of other Seminole and Creek villages: the Chihaw Lower
Creeks on the upper Flint River, 400; the Indians at Red
Ground, twenty; Cheskee Tallosa, sixty; Kivah Rawon and
Cedar Creeks, 100; Mikasuki Seminole, 700; the Tallasees, 200;
and the Pensacola Red Sticks, 800. In all there were 3,255 men,
of whom 2,800 were immediately ready to take up arms. While
these estimates included some boys between the ages of ten and
fourteen, they were not disconcerting to the British, who believed that only some 1,200 Creek warriors remained faithful to
the Americans.23
The forces enumerated by Woodbine represented the
survivors of the Indian bands who had already tried their
22. Woodbine to Pigot, May 25, 1814, ibid., 12-13; Woodbine to Hope, May
31, 1814, ibid., 13; Toulmin to Jackson, June 22, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence to Jackson, II, 9-11; letter from Pensacola, June 8, 1814,
ibid., 7; John Gordon to Jackson, July 20, 1814, ibid., 17-18.
23. Woodbine-Pigot information, CP, 2326, 151-59.
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strength against the Americans, and it was possible that others
might later join them. An attempt was made to sow disaffection
among the Creeks who, under Big Warrior, had remained
friendly to the United States and whose strength the British
estimated to be some 1,200 men. These Indians, however, had
not yet been alienated from the Americans by the Fort Jackson
treaty, which lay in the future, and the bitterness which they
felt to the Red Sticks as a result of the Creek civil war had not
been forgotten. More important, they had witnessed the futility
of nativist resistance to the United States and were shrewd
enough to realize the danger of committing themselves to the
British while the Americans remained in control of the south.
At the same time, even the “progressive” Creeks were disturbed by the repeated encroachment upon Indian land, and
they were willing to court the British. Woodbine dispatched
emissaries to the main Lower Creek towns of Coweta and
Cussita, conveying the message of pan-Indianism that had once
belonged to Tecumseh. The Creeks, he said, should unite with
the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokees against the Americans.
Meetings were held in the Creek country, and thanks were returned to the British for the presents that had been received. It
was acknowledged that the unification of the tribes had long
been the cherished desire of the Creeks and that they had never
ceased their fidelity to the British crown and their claims upon
British protection. But for the time being, that was as far as
they were willing to go.24
The Indians assembling at Apalachicola, in the meantime,
were amenable to British suggestions. On May 28 Woodbine
harangued the local Seminoles, emphasizing the strength of the
British king and his determination to help the Indians. “He
wants to protect all Indians,” the warriors were told, “and to
make them into one family that they may unite and drive the
children of the bad spirit out of their lands and hunting
grounds.” But the war must be fought according to the standards
of British humanity, and rewards were offered for prisoners delivered to the soldiers.25 The chiefs signed a bizarre document
24. Creek Nation to Cochrane, CP, 2328, 18-19; Benjamin Hawkins to John
Armstrong, July 13, 1814, American State Papers, 38 vols. (Washington,
D.C. 1832-61), Indian Affairs, Class II, 2 vols., I, 860.
25. Woodbine to the Indians, May 28, 1814, CP, 2328, 15.
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pledging themselves to preserve the lives of captives: “In the
name of all the chiefs of the Creek Nations now assembled in
arms against the Americans we promise to spare the lives of all
the prisoners taken, whether man, woman or child, and to give
them up to Captain Woodbine of the Royal Marines who has
informed us that they would be a gratefull [sic] present to our
Father King George.“26
The Indian response to Woodbine convinced Pigot that if
sufficient stores could be arranged the tribesmen could become
an important military force. Forty pistols, powder and ball,
eleven barrels of cornpowder, drums, a launch and equipment,
100 pounds of tobacco, seventy-five blankets, sixty gallons of
wine, a coat, and an epaulet were unloaded, and Pigot left
Apalachicola carrying Seminole addresses to Cochrane. He left
Woodbine, Denny, and Smith behind to work with the Indians.
He ordered Captain Nicholas Lockyer of the sloop Sophie to
take under his command the Childers and Shelburne, make
contact with the Pensacola Red Sticks, and maintain a supply
from New Providence to Apalachicola.27
Cochrane was no less enthusiastic than Pigot, whose report he
forwarded to the Admiralty together with his own observation
that if 3,000 British troops were landed at Mobile, and were
joined by the Indians, Jean Lafitte’s Baratarian privateers, and
the Spanish, they “would drive the Americans entirely out of
Louisiana and the Floridas.”28 To follow up Pigot’s mission, the
admiral organized an expeditionary force of 114 men, two
howitzers, and a field piece to convey to Apalachicola 300 suits
of clothing, 1,000 stand of arms, and other provisions for the
Indians.29 In an exhortation to the chiefs, Cochrane explained
that “your Father King George will not suffer his Indian Children
to be made Slaves of by his rebellious Subjects” and that the
men and arms had been sent to support them. He contended
that the United States would leave the Indians “not one foot
26.

Thomas Perryman and Cappachamico, pledge, May 28, 1814, ibid. These
chiefs were Seminoles, but at this time the Seminole bands regarded
themselves as part of the Creek Nation.
27. CP, 2326, 160; Pigot to Nicholas Lockyer, June 11, 1814, CP, 2328, 2425; Thomas and William Perryman, Cappachamico and other chiefs
to Cochrane, 1814, ADM/1/506/402-03; Pigot to Cochrane, June 8, 1814,
ibid., 394-99.
28. Cochrane to Admiralty, June 20, 1814, ADM/1/506/390-93.
29. Ibid., July 23, 1814, ADM/1/506/478-79.
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of land . . . to the Eastward of the Mississippi” and that the
message must be circulated to the Negroes of Georgia and the
Carolinas and to any Indians friendly to the Americans. Significantly, Cochrane referred to the large British forces being
prepared for the attacks on the American seaboard and added
that, in the event of a peace, “your rights will not be forgotten.”
These promises were to be important to the Indians, who would,
in time, expect the British to fulfill them.30
On June 30 Woodbine was appointed auxiliary captain of
the Corps of Colonial Marines, of which the expeditionary
force to be embarked was the basis; the balance would be recruited from loyalists and Negroes. To command the expedition,
Cochrane selected from his flagship, Tonnant, Major Edward
Nicolls of the Royal Marines, a man of attested gallantry,
known as “Fighting Nicolls.” He has been described by one
historian of the marines as “possibly the most distinguished
officer the corps ever had.“31 In July 1814 Nicolls was ordered to
place himself at the head of the irregular operations in the
American South and was empowered to raise 500 men as a
colonial regiment in support of the Indians. During the next
four years, Nicolls developed a close relationship with the
Indians, and he became their most consistently outspoken white
champion.
His instructions enjoined him both to raise and command a
colonial regiment and to instruct, assist, and direct the Indians
in military matters. He bore with him a copy of Pigot’s report
and of Cochrane’s proclamation to the natives which would
serve as letters of introduction. Cochrane permitted Nicolls considerable freedom of action, providing he refrained from acts of
hostility to the United States within Spanish territory, except in
self defense. The troops and stores were embarked at New
Providence aboard the Hermes (Captain William Henry Percy),
and the Carron (Captain Robert Cavendish Spencer), largely
upon the orders of Governor Cameron. Cochrane had Cameron
30. Cochrane to Indian chiefs, June 29, 1814, ADM/1/505/163-64.
31. P. C. Smith, Per Mare Per Terram: A History of the Royal Marines
(St. Ives, Huntingdon, 1974), 45. A sketch of Nicolls is contained in
ibid., 45-47. See also William James, Naval History of Great Britain,
6 vols. (London, 1878), III, 197-99, 291-96, IV, 221, 347, 431; Admiralty
Navy Lists (London, issues between 1814 and 1864); Cochrane to
Woodbine, June 30, 1814, CP, 2326, 190-91; Nicolls, Memorial, 1817,
WO/1/144/419-22; Nicolls, Commission, July 4, 1814, CP, 2326, 192-93.
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informed that Britain’s only intention was to “preserve the
Indians from being destroyed by the United States.” The admiral,
in his proclamation, had promised the Indians two field pieces,
2,000 stand of guns, and 1,000 swords, and Nicolls drew upon
Cameron for two long twenty-four pounders, launches and flatboats, belts, fowling pieces, powder flasks, flints, sabres, buttons,
jackets, epaulets, vermillion, and $100 worth of presents.32
Before Nicolls reached Apalachicola Bay in August 1814, a
new development had increased the prospects of the Indians’
engaging the American forces, and they were, themselves, the
cause of the changing circumstances. Andrew Jackson, district
commander of the American troops, had viewed with alarm
the resurgence of the Indian cause. He complained to Governor
Mateo González Manrique of Pensacola that the British had
been allowed to mobilize upon Spanish soil against the United
States, and that the Spaniards themselves were harboring refugee Red Sticks. McQueen and Francis, Jackson maintained,
should be surrendered to the Americans. In view of the aggressive attitude of Jackson and the Americans to both the Creeks
and the Spaniards in recent years, these aggrieved protestations
failed to impress Manrique. 33 Nevertheless, the governor was
alarmed. The solution to the problem was not easy to find. While
the Spanish were too weak to successfully contest the United
States, they feared that an attempt to improve their position
might cost them any remaining American goodwill. Confronted
by the threat from Jackson, but unwilling to act in any way
that might antagonize the Americans, they vacillated. Governor
Manrique refused to sever connections with his Creek allies and
sent appeals for help to his superior, Apodaca, at Havana, but
he shrank from too vigorous a defense of Pensacola. Apodaca, on
his part, was willing to allow Nicolls’s Indians and British to
operate as they desired, provided that they recognized Spanish
control of St. Marks, St. Augustine, and Pensacola, but he refused to give direct aid.34
32. Cochrane to Nicolls, July 4, 1814, ADM/1/506/480-85; Cochrane to
Admiralty, July 23, 1814, ibid., 478-79; Cochrane to Cameron, July 4,
1814, CP, 2328, 30; Nicolls to Cochrane, July 27, 1814, ibid., 54-55;
Cochrane to William Henry Percy, July 5, 1814, ADM/1/506/486-87.
33. Jackson to Mateo González Manrique, July 12, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 15-16; Gordon to Jackson, July 20, 1814,
ibid., 17-18; Manrique to Jackson, July 26, 1814, ibid., 20-21.
34. Cameron to Ruis de Apodaca, July 29, 1814, CP, 2328, 40; Percy to
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Unaware of the frustrations to be imposed upon them in
their dealings with the Spaniards, the British were determined
to employ their Indian allies, if necessary, in a resolute defense of Pensacola. Learning of the apprehensions of the Spanish
governor there, Woodbine, at Apalachicola, abandoned his plans
to attack an American post, Fort Hawkins, and set his forces in
motion towards the Spanish town. Sergeant Smith, who had
been given the local rank of lieutenant, and the Seminole leaders,
Thomas and Benjamin Perryman, were instructed to march
from Apalachicola to Pensacola with 300 men, while Woodbine
embarked with the stores on the Sophie and the Cockchafer to
arrive at his destination on July 28.35
When Nicolls arrived at Prospect Bluff in August, therefore,
Woodbine was absent, although Smith and Denny were drilling
Indians in the adjacent countryside and other natives were daily
arriving to receive provisions and arms. For the first time
Nicolls was awakened to the animosity many of the destitute
Indians bore the United States. Commenting upon one group
of eighty who arrived at the Bluff, he wrote, “such objects I
never saw the like of, absolute skin and bone, but cheerfull [sic]
and resolved to do their utmost against the common enemy. An
old man told me, when I asked him how far it was to where
the enemy were, and if he new [sic] the way to lead me to them,
he said it was seven days journey to them [about 300 miles] that
he could not miss the way for it was marked by the graves of his
five children.” However, attention was now pivoted upon Pensacola, and Nicolls did not remain at Prospect Bluff. Leaving some
arms there, he sailed for the Spanish town, arriving there on
August 24 and manning one of the forts.36
The arrival of Nicolls at Apalachicola had marked a further
advance in the fortunes of the Indians hostile to the United
Cochrane, August 4, 1814, ibid., 43; Nicolls, August 4, 1814, ibid., 52-53;
David Hope to Cameron, July 29, 1814, CP, 2338, 47; letter from
Havana, August 8, 1814, Arséne Lacarrière Latour, Historical Memoir
of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-15 (Philadelphia,
1816), Appendix 2, v-vii.
35. Woodbine to Lockyer, July 30, 1814, CP, 2328, 39; Woodbine to
Smith, July 21, 22, 1814, ibid., 33-34; Woodbine to Cochrane, July 25,
1814, ibid., 35-36; Woodbine to Cameron, July 26, 1814, ibid., 37;
Woodbine to Cochrane, August 9, 1814, ibid., 56-57.
36. Nicolls to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, ibid., 59-61' Percy, September 9,
1814, ibid., 74-80.
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States. Their requests had been partly responsible for bringing
the British to Apalachicola, and the advent of Woodbine and
Nicolls helped them satisfy their immediate needs of food,
clothing, and arms. There were also prospects of reversing the
military position in the south. Excited by the thought of major
British conquests and the promise of being included in any
peace settlement, the Indians saw a possible opportunity to regain their lost territories and to expel the rapacious American
invaders. Nor was their confidence in the British entirely misplaced. Cochrane had remonstrated with his government on
behalf of the Indians in June 1814, and on December 7, 1814,
reiterated his concern: “The imbecility of the Spanish Government in West Florida and their natural jealousy leave the
Americans every opportunity of encroaching upon the Indians,
and as it appears to be the object of the American Government,
to cut off all communications between the Indians and Great
Britain, by driving the Creeks out of their country and possessing
both sides of the Apalachicola, I trust that in any future negotiations of a pacific nature, stipulations will be made for repossessing
the Indians of the Territory they have been deprived of.“37
Not the least important consequence of the British intervention, therefore, was the renewed hope and the fillip it gave
to the nativist morale. Cochrane received a proclamation from
Nicolls, McQueen, Francis, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico
which voiced their intention to “live or die free of which we
have given hard proof by choosing to abandon our Country rather
than live in it as slaves.” They described the Spanish as “‘weak,
frail friends,” but the Indians had been impressed with British
verve: “since your sons came here . . . we walk like men in their
streets.“38
If the arrival of the British had stiffened the resolve of the
Indians, it was not, by itself, sufficient to win over to the
nativists those tribesmen who had been willing to accept
American domination. The battle lines remained largely as
before, the difference being simply that the belligerent Seminoles and surviving Red Sticks could now call upon the British,
37. Cochrane to Admiralty, December 7, 1814, ADM/1/505/150-51; Cochrane
to Admiralty, June 22, 1814, ADM/1/506/343.
38. Peter McQueen, Francis, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico to Cochrane,
September 1, 1814, ADM/1/505/165-66.
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as well as the Spanish, for support. Their morale and prospects
had improved, but military superiority in the south still remained firmly with the United States. That being so, the Creeks
under the Big Warrior, the Choctaws, the Chickasaws, and the
Cherokees continued overtly to remain friendly to the Americans.
If they were to align with the nativists, a major military breakthrough by the British would be necessary. There are reasons
to believe that had the British achieved such a success most of
the southern Indians, despite the machinations of American
agents, would have joined their Seminole and Red Stick
brethren. Much restrained discontent existed among the tribesmen, and it was enhanced in the summer of 1814 by the harshness of Jackson’s Indian policy.
To some extent the extremity of Jackson’s dealings with the
Indians reflected his concern at the implications of the British
arrival at Apalachicola. As early as July, after receiving definite
news of the landing, Jackson induced the United States to reappraise its plans to disband the militia. He argued that Pensacola should be occupied since it provided a haven from which
hostile Indians might raid American settlements;39 Jackson issued
an ultimatum to the remaining recalcitrant Creeks, demanding
that they surrender by August 1 .40 At Fort Jackson on August 9
he imposed upon the tribe his treaty, seizing about half of their
land in order to separate the Indians from their potential allies,
the Spaniards. The belief that the treaty of Fort Jackson would
cement the Indians in friendship to the United States was,
perhaps, a cynical one. On August 10 Jackson recommended
that food and clothing be distributed to the neutral Creeks, “or
necessity will compell them to embrace the proffered friendship
of the British. . . . To clothe the whole number will cost a considerable sum; but this sum would be very inferior to the Value
of the territory ceded to the United States; in addition to which
I may observe, that the cession has made them our friends, and
will in future effectually prevent their becoming our enemies.“41
Unable, however, to understand the form of friendship that
deprived them so unjustly of about half of their land, even the
39. Jackson to Armstrong, July 24, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson,
II, 19-20; Jackson to David Holmes, ibid., 18-19; Jackson to Armstrong,
July 30, 1814, ibid., 22-23.
40. Jackson to John Coffee, July 17, 1814, ibid., 16-17.
41. Jackson to Armstrong, August 19, 1814, ibid., 24-26.
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pacific Creeks grew restless. The Big Warrior, who had held fast
to the Americans throughout the Creek war, was regarded with
suspicion by Jackson’s colleagues. The general even demanded
a liberal policy to be pursued with the Choctaws, hitherto considered as a neutral or friendly tribe, to check the growth of
dissension.42 While Jackson alternated a cool hand of charity
with an iron fist, Indians were reported to be “pouring” into
the British camps for arms. The Big Warrior established amicable
relations with the Seminoles and was alleged to have “cut” with
the Americans; plans were afoot to reconcile him with the Red
Sticks. Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw delegates contacted
Nicolls, and some Shawnees from the north relayed the news
that “they are coming to join us right through the enemy’s
country. The chiefs all believe it but it appears very improbable
to me. . . . When I asked one of their messengers what they did
for provisions he replied most seriously that in their first attack
they destroyed 500 of the Americans and barbacued [sic] the
fattest of them and since that they never were in want.“43 There
were, therefore, constant demands upon the British for supplies.
At Apalachicola British vessels unloaded provisions and arms for
transportation in shallow boats up the river to Prospect Bluff
where Lieutenants Mitchell and Sergeant were strengthening the
fort there. Ships also visited Pensacola. Yet at both places it was
necessary to send out parties of Indians to forage, and on September 4 one group attacked a house near Mobile, killing or
capturing a white man and three Negroes. The incident prompted
Jackson to demand the seizure of Pensacola and the construction
of an American fort upon the Apalachicola.44
The Treaty of Fort Jackson probably pushed many wavering.
Indians towards the nativists and the British, and it multiplied
the resentment of others. Cochrane and Nicolls appeared to be
the only immediate means whereby lost lands might be regained,
but, notwithstanding this, if an intertribal alliance was to be
42.

Ibid., August 5, 1814, ibid., 30-31; Jackson to Rachel Jackson, August 28,
1814, ibid., 35: W. C. C. Claiborne to Jackson, August 29, 1814, ibid., 3536; Big Warrior to Hawkins, August 25, 1814, ibid., 36; James Monroe to
Jackson, September 5, 1814, ibid., 43; Jackson to Monroe, October 14,
1814, ibid., 72-74.
43. Nicolls to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-61. The reference is
presumably to the battle of Frenchtown, January 22, 1813.
44. Jackson to Monroe, September 5, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of
Jackson, II, 42; Jackson to Manrique, September 9, 1814, ibid., 44-56.
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consummated, the necessity for British victories in the field was
paramount. Unfortunately, their first attempt to both display
their own martial prowess and to employ their existing Indian
allies degenerated into a humiliating fiasco. To strengthen his
hold upon the Gulf coast, Nicolls attempted to capture Mobile, a
garrison with only some 158 fit men at the time of his attack.45
At Pensacola Nicolls had at his disposal a number of men from
his colonial marines, a few British vessels, and the Indians. The
latter were daily increasing. They arrived as destitute refugees,
many in so poor a condition that they were not immediately
serviceable as a military force. It was estimated in August
by Captain Lockyer that 1,000 Indians were at Pensacola, of
whom 700 were warriors, Woodbine placed their strength even
higher at 2,000, of whom 800 were fighting men. Some of these
Indian forces had come from Apalachicola. Their chiefs were
McQueen, Francis, John of the Attassees, Old Factor of the
Euchees, Hopoeth Mico of the Four Nations, and Colonel
Perryman of the Seminoles. It is probable that they were respectably armed. Lockyer distributed six cases of arms and eight
kegs of powder to the Pensacola Red Sticks, and munitions had
also been ferried from Apalachicola.46 A setback, however, to
Nicoll’s attempts to recruit men for an assault upon Mobile
occurred at the beginning of September when Lockyer failed
to win the allegiance of the Baratarian pirates under the
command of the Lafitte brothers.47
About 190 Indians participated in the attack upon Mobile
on September 12-15, 1814; 130 warriors were on board the four
British ships and sixty were ashore with Lieutenant Castle.
During an engagement between the vessels and the batteries of
Fort Bowyer both Percy and Nicolls, aboard the Hermes, were
wounded. Nicolls lost the sight of his right eye. Nor more
successful were Captain Robert Harvey and a shore party, who
advanced on September 14 with a howitzer to within 800 yards
of the fort but who were compelled to retreat before heavy
American fire. The following day the vessels stood in while
45. Jackson to Monroe, September 17, 1814, ibid., 50-51.
46. Lockyer to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 67-68; Woodbine to
Cochrane, August 9, 1814, ibid., 56-57; Nicolls, expenses, enclosed in
Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21, 1815, WO/1/143/123-27.
47. John Sugden, “Jean Lafitte and the British, Offer of 1814,” Louisiana
History, XX (Spring 1979), 159-67.
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the troops approached along the beach to fire upon Fort Bowyer
with the howitzer. The latter expended all its available shells and
case shot without success, and an attempt was made to storm the
American positions by landing parties from the boats supported
by Indians on the shore. When these efforts also proved futile, the
whole British and Indian force fell back to Pensacola. Their performance had been a lamentable one; they had lost the Hermes,
which ran ashore, and thirty-two men killed and thirty-seven
wounded aboard the ships. Scant casualties— four killed and five
wounded— had been inflicted upon the enemy. Indian participation in the affair seems to have been minimal.48
The reverse at Mobile deprived the British of an opportunity
to advance their cause among the uncommitted Indian tribes,
but it was scarcely significant compared with the importance attached to the defense of Pensacola. This Spanish town had been
a traditional prop of Creek independence of the United States
since the post-revolutionary time of Alexander McGillivray. It
had supplied ammunition and shelter to the Red Sticks in their
war of 1813-1814, and its capture could not fail to impress Indians
throughout the south. It became increasingly clear that the
Americans would make an attempt against Pensacola, and the
debacle at Mobile served to increase the necessity for Jackson
to do so. Aware of the weakness of the Spaniards, he was prepared to force the issue with Governor Manrique. On August 24
Jackson repeated his allegations that the Spanish were harboring Indians hostile to the United States.49 Manrique, in reply,
recalled recent American aggression against Spain’s possessions
and declared the Treaty of Fort Jackson to be void, a matter that
would be taken up with his home government in Spain.50 Jackson
was unimpressed. He mobilized his militia, which included, significantly, 700 Choctaws, and eventually marched upon the
town. An admonition of October 21 from Secretary of State
James Monroe ordered the general not to take “measures which

48.

Nicolls to Cochrane, August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-61; Percy to
Cochrane, September 16, 1814, ibid., 83-87; Robert Harvey to Nicolls,
September 20, 1814, ibid., 91; Cochrane to Admiralty, December 7, 1814,
ADM/1/505/150-51; list of casualties, ibid., 161-62.
49. Jackson to Manrique, August 24, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of
Jackson, II, 28-29.
50. Manrique to Jackson, August 30, 1814, ibid., 37-40.
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would involve this Government in a contest with Spain” but
arrived too late to interfere with the expedition.51
The British and Indian participation in the defense of Pensacola proved to be both ineffective and fraught with difficulties.
Provisioning the large numbers of Indians assembling there was
perennially embarrassing, for, although some supplies were
brought in by sea, most had to be purchased locally and shortages and profiteering drove up prices. Difficulties were constantly
encountered in procuring clothing, blankets, needles, vermillion,
ammunition, salt, and food. Woodbine lacked sufficient ready cash
and found himself dredging his private resources and borrowing to meet the outlay, and, since American supplies were
gradually stifled, Nicolls reported the necessity of smuggling
flour into Pensacola.52 British inability to meet all the accounts
of the Pensacola merchants immediately did not improve their
relationships with the local residents, but a more contentious
matter still was Nicolls’s recruitment of slaves to the fury of the
slaveholders. The blacks had not rallied to the British standard
as readily as had the Indians, and only about eighty of them
were at this time assembled at Prospect Bluff. Others were with
Nicolls at Pensacola, and some of them were claimed as the
property of local dignitaries, such as the Indian trader John
Forbes. Since the British had announced on August 26 and
August 29 that neutral rights would be safeguarded, and Nicolls
was present at Pensacola as an ally of the Spaniards, there was
logic in the complaints of Forbes and other slaveowners that
53
they had been poorly treated . It is impossible to determine how
far the Negroes had been impressed by Nicolls, or whether they
were simply enlisting with the British to take advantage of their
standing offer of land in the colonies open to slaves volunteering
for service. Whatever the truth of the matter, however, it held
important implications for Indian resistance in the south, because during the ensuing decades the communities of largely

51. Monroe to Jackson, October 21, 1814, ibid., 79-80; Jackson to Monroe,
October 26, 1814, ibid., 82-83.
52. Woodbine to Nicolls, October 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 95; Woodbine to
Nicolls, September 27, 1814, ibid., 93; Woodbine accounts, ibid., 100,
107; Nicolls to naval commissioners, October 1814, ibid., 102.
53. John Forbes and thirty-three Spanish inhabitants to Manrique, March
1815, ibid,, 148-51.
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free Negroes located in the Seminole country were to be principal forces in the fight against tribal removal.54
The Negro issue at Pensacola intensified difficulties which
had already developed among the Indians, the British, and
John Forbes. The Red Sticks charged that Forbes had so stifled
supplies of ammunition to Indians during the Creek war that
they had been compelled to retreat to Pensacola. This was all the
more irritating, since lands on the Apalachicola River had been
ceded to Forbes’s company by Seminoles and Creeks in 1804 and
1811 conditional upon Forbes’s operating an Indian trade with
regulated prices. Under this front, the warriors alleged, Forbes
had attempted to settle Indian land. In addition to the native
grievances, the British had evidence that Forbes was now
committed to a south dominated by American rather than
British, or even Spanish, suzerainty, although his company
continued to operate out of Pensacola. One partner, James
Innerarity, was, in 1816, major of the American town of Mobile
and colonel of the Mobile militia, and he was in regular contact
with his brother, John Innerarity at Pensacola. In an intercepted letter of 1814 to Doyle and Hambly at Apalachicola, it
was revealed that Forbes himself, in St. Augustine, had urged his
employees to dissuade the Indians from joining the British. It
was comparatively easy, therefore, for the Indians and the British
to regard the Forbes company as a source of espionage and as
an obstruction to their efforts.55
The problems with Forbes and other Pensacola residents did
not end when the British eventually departed. At that time
Nicolls made efforts to settle debts with the local merchants, and
in February 1815 Cochrane appointed a committee to investigate
and liquidate claims upon the British. However, the admiral
declared that he had no power over any Negroes except those
actually taken by the British Marines; he assumed no responsibility for those still with the Indians. This did not appease
all slaveowners, and Forbes and Company continued to agitate
54. Kenneth Wiggins Porter, “Negroes and the Seminole War, 1817-1818,”
Journal of Negro History, XXXVI (July 1951), 249-80; Porter, “Negroes
and the Seminole War, 1835-1842,” Journal of Southern History, XXX
(November 1964), 427-50.
55. Owsley, “British and Indian Activities,” 118-19; Boyd, “Events at
Prospect Bluff,” 61-65; Indian chiefs to British government, March
10; 1815, WO/1/143/147-50; Nicolls to Cochrane, March 1816,
WO/1/144/151-53.
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upon this account and was able to obtain the arrest and imprisonment of Woodbine at New Providence in October 1815
on charges of appropriating slaves. As late as 1854, John
Innerarity was claiming indemnification for forty-five slaves from
the British. Such discontent was probably due in part to the
attempt of the British after the war to fulfill their obligations
to the enlisted Negroes. Although an effort was made to persuade the latter to return to their former masters, they were
offered the choice of enlisting in the West Indian Regiments or
of taking small pieces of land in the West Indies as free settlers.
Alternatively, they might remain at the fort at Prospect Bluff,
or on the Suwannee River, or live with the Indians. To the
chagrin of Innerarity and his colleagues, many of the Negroes
preferred these courses to returning to their masters.56
More important than these disputes, however, in the defense
of Pensacola, was the friction between Nicolls and Governor
Manrique. Strained relations between the two made any concerted effort impossible. Manrique was unwilling to antagonize
Jackson unnecessarily realizing his weak position in the event
of an American attack. He sought to retain control of the defense of Pensacola: whereas Nicolls and Captain James Alexander
Gordon of the Seahorse, who arrived with the Mars and the
Shelburne, demanded a more aggressive approach to the
problem. The Spanish, Nicolls reported, were “slumbering
amidst the threatened storm,” but, apart from launching weak
Indian sorties against American forces which flitted about the
area, there was little he could do without more cooperation.57
In an attempt to reverse the lethargy in the defense, the British,
somewhat arbitrarily, interfered with Manrique’s supervision
of the preparations to resist Jackson’s army. On November 2,
they threatened to evacuate their forces unless Fort Barrancas
56. Nicolls to Gordon, November 7, 1814, CP, 2328, 114; British public
notice, March 9, 1815, ibid., 165; claims of Forbes and others for
Negroes, ibid., 172-79; Cochrane to John Wilson Croker, February 25,
1815, ADM/1/508/570-71; Cochrane to Robert Cavendish Spencer, George
Taylor, and Robert Gamble, February 17, 1815, ibid., 572-74; Cochrane
to Pulteney Malcolm, February 17, 1815, ibid., 562-63; Nicolls to
Hawkins, April 28, 1815, WO/1/143/161-62; WO/1/144/155-70; “Documents Relating to Colonel Edward Nicholls and Captain George
Woodbine in Pensacola, 1814,” Florida Historical Quarterly, X (July
1931), 51-54; Wright, “Note on First Seminole War,” 569; Boyd, “Events
at Prospect Bluff,” 72, 74.
57. Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, CP, 2328, 199-11; Nicolls to
Apodaca, November 9, 1814, ibid., 103-04.
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and the harbor entrance were placed under the joint control of
58
Manrique and Nicolls. In reply the governor explained that
“it was not in the power of the Governor to declare war.“59
On November 3-5, the Indians and their families were moved
across Pensacola Bay to a place of greater safety, and the next
day the Americans opened fire upon Fort St. Miguel, near the
town, partly manned by the British. Jackson called upon the
Spaniards to surrender and while Manrique replied that he
would repel any attack upon the town, his hand was weakened
by the attitudes of his British allies, who believed that a successful defense was no longer possible. Gordon brusquely informed
the governor that 600 Indian warriors had been sent to Apalachicola, and that “the enemy had already got possession of a
post that he [Manrique] should have defended, that from his
conduct, I was certain he had betrayed his trust, and as it was
my duty to provide for the safety of the troops and the ships
under my orders, I should destroy the Barrancas and the Fort
on Santa Rosa, embarking the Spanish troops who choose to
come off whenever I saw the enemy in possession of the town.
By my direction the fort on Santa Rosa was destroyed that
evening.“60
Pensacola was stormed by Jackson’s force on November 7;
little resistance was offered. The following day Nicolls sent away
the Indian rear guard, 200 Spanish soldiers were embarked from
Barrancas, the guns were spiked, surplus arms and stores destroyed, and the fortifications blown up. The squadron remained
in the harbor only long enough to cover the retreat of the
Indians. Then it left with all but one of the ships sailing for
Apalachicola with the British and Spanish forces. Because the
British vessels were busy elsewhere, Manrique’s soldiers did
not leave Apalachicola and return to Pensacola until the summer
of 1815.61
58. Nicolls and Gordon to Manrique, November 2, 1814, ADM/1/505/71;
Nicolls and Gordon to Manrique, October 11, 1814, CP, 2328, 96;
Nicolls to Apodaca, November 9, 1814, ibid., 103-04.
59. Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, ibid., 109-11.
60. Ibid.; Manrique to Jackson, November 6, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence
of Jackson, II, 93.
61. Gordon to Apodaca, November 9, 1814, ADM/1/505/169-70; Gordon to
Cochrane, November 18, 1814, CP, 2328, 109-11: Jackson to Monroe,
November 14, 1814, Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 96-99;
Cochrane, February 17, 1815, ADM/1/508/556-61.
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Jackson’s occupation of Pensacola represented the second
defeat for the infant British-Indian alliance, and a more serious
one than Mobile. It strongly indicated the military preeminence
of the United States, and must have counteracted the headway
which the British and their Indian allies had made among the
neutral tribes. Seven months earlier, the fall of Pensacola would
have been disastrous for the nativists, since it had been the
major source of succour for Francis and McQueen’s Red Sticks.
In November, however, Apalachicola offered an alternative, especially as the position was being gradually strengthened. The
British, supervised by Lieutenant Christie of the Royal Artillery,
completed their fort at Prospect Bluff on the east bank of the
river, and another fort was built at the forks of the Apalachicola.
The immediate consequence of the fall of Pensacola, therefore,
was a transfer of the Indian strength to Apalachicola, where
they continued to assemble and arm. Jackson was disturbed by
the concentration, but an American expedition against the
Indians under Major Uriah Blue was not successful.62
In November Nicolls’s principal objective was to maintain
a force which could collaborate with Cochrane’s invasion fleet,
then assembling in the West Indies. At Apalachicola three
companies of Negro Colonial Marines had been formed, and a
fourth was in the process of organization. There was still hope
of harnessing the neutral Creeks, for whom £500 worth of
presents were being prepared, and the Cherokees, who received
British arms. It is not inconceivable that the arrival in the
Gulf of Mexico of Cochrane’s forces at the end of the month
encouraged more Indians to join the British. On December 22,
1814, for example, the 1,100 warriors, 450 women, and 755
children at Apalachicola were joined by 500 newcomers,
“several wavering towns” having “lately joined us from the
American Lines,” and early in January “two different Indian
tribes from the neighbourhood of the American lines,” some
1,100 men, arrived.63 Probably there were over 2,000 Indian
fighting men gathered at the Bluff at the time, although British
62. Nicolls to Cochrane,. August 12, 1814, CP, 2328, 59-61; Boyd, “Events at
Prospect Bluff,” 71-73; Jackson to James Winchester, November 22, 1814,
Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, II, 104-07.
63. Robert Henry to Cochrane, December 22, 1814, CP, 2328, 126; William
Rawlins to Cochrane, January 16, 1815, ibid., 136-37; Nicolls to Cochrane,
December 3, 1814, ibid., 117-18.
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estimates held that 3,551 warriors were available for service. Of
these 1,421 resided on or near the Apalachicola River, 800 were
Red Sticks, 400 were Chihaw Lower Creeks, 760 were Seminoles
or Mikasuki, and 170 were Negroes from the area eastwards of
the Flint and the Apalachicola rivers. None of the neutral tribes
had come over to the British, although it is possible to argue that
the Choctaw were substantially with the Americans. The most
promising recruits were still the Big Warrior Creeks, who were
believed to have 2,540 warriors, of whom some 1,300 had been
with the Red Sticks during the Creek war.64
During this period the relationship between the nativists
and Nicolls and Woodbine matured into one of mutual affection.
Working daily with the Indians, the two British officers developed a respect for their allies which stands in stark contrast
to the bigoted arrogance with which they were regarded by many
British leaders.65 Among the chiefs at Apalachicola who were
frequently in British company were McQueen, Francis, John,
Old Factor, Hopoeth Mico, Perryman, Cappachamico, and
Hopoy Mico; the latter two, both Seminoles, had remained at
Prospect Bluff during the operations at Pensacola. Cappachamico and Perryman were reported much annoyed with John
Forbes, and with other Indians, confiscated the company’s
property at the Bluff and rescinded the land grants made earlier
to the traders. In particular, the “brave and faithful old Chief”
Cappachamico, as Nicolls called him, bore such a grievance
against Forbes that he vowed his death. It was this warrior, who,
with Perryman, Francis, and others, visited Cochrane’s flagship,
the Tonnant, when it arrived in Apalachicola Bay late in 1814,
and who, in company with Hopoy Mico, Francis, and some
colleagues, was entertained aboard the Erebus when it arrived in
the bay in January 1815.66
For all their understanding, however, Nicolls and Woodbine, like most white men who met Indians, did not doubt that
aboriginal society was inferior to that of their own. A philanthropic sentiment was present. Woodbine, for instance, proudly
64. “Return of Muscogee or Creek Indians,” WO/1/143/174-75.
65. For example, compare Mahon, War of 1812, 352, with Jane Lucas de
Grummond, The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans (Baton
Rouge, 1961), 68-69.
66. Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 117-18; David Ewen
Bartholomew to Cochrane, February 6, 1815, ibid., 145; Nicolls, expenses,
enclosed in Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21, 1815, WO/1/143/123-27.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol60/iss3/3

26

Sugden: The Southern Indians In The War of 1812: The Closing Phase
SOUTHERN INDIANS IN THE WAR

OF

1812

299

declared that “the lessons of humanity, inculcated in the minds
of our aggrieved red brethren have not been thrown away.” As
he confided to Nicolls, “Their having given up unhurt to
yourself all the prisoners captured by them since your arrival,
makes me feel not a little proud in having been the first instrument of inducing them to lay aside the tomahawk and the scalping knife.” The warriors were even willing to “liberate their
slaves, tho’they were to lose what they cost them.” “The Indian
character,” he believed, “has been much mistaken and has been
most unjustly stigmatized as bloody and ferocious. You have
been long enough among them to observe many most amiable
traits in them, which only want the fostering hand of instruction
and the light of Christianity to mature. You often said that
with a little trouble and expense these our loyal brethren might
be civilized. Be assured, Sir, it is the truth and a very few
thousands expended on that laudable object would insure to
Great Britain thousands of most faithful and obedient subjects
whose loyalty has stood unshaken to our Sovereign [in] spite of
all the allurements held out to them by the Americans.“67
Patronizing as many of these remarks may have been, they
reflect a recognition by both Nicolls and Woodbine of qualities
in the Indians missed by many contemporaries.
Inevitably, the concentration of men at the Bluff posed the
usual problem of supplies. Considerable quantities of provisions
and munitions were required. The Alceste, for example, landed
thirty-seven cases of arms and casks of flints, five bales, nine
cases, four casks, eighteen bundles, ten cradles, and four bags
of “sundry stores,” 200 barrels of ball cartridges, 1,600 sand
bags, three cases of tools, seventy-five shovels, and other implements.68 In November the Seahorse and the Childers deposited
stores, three six-pounder pieces, and $4,000; $3,000 was for the
use of Woodbine and the balance for Nicolls.69 The attrition was
particularly severe upon food supplies. In December twelve
barrels of flour were consumed each day, and in times of acute
stress Nicolls was compelled to send the warriors into the woods
to hunt.70 Even the river exacerbated the difficulties, for the
67. Woodbine to Nicolls, October 27, 1814, CP, 2328, 145.
68. List of goods aboard the Alceste, ibid., 108.
69. Gordon to Cochrane, November 19, 1814, ibid., 111-12.
70. Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, ibid., 117-18; Rawlins to Senior
Officer, Pensacola, January 16, 1815, ibid., 138.
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ebbs in the Apalachicola obstructed the shallow-draught vessels
which conveyed provisions to Prospect Bluff, and the bar in
the bay sometimes necessitated the lightening of the victualling
ships before they could pass towards the river mouth. Thus, the
Erebus, which arrived off St. George’s Island on January 22, 1815,
was not able to shift supplies up the Apalachicola until the
twenty-eighth.71
Nevertheless, a formidable force of men was assembled and
maintained at Prospect Bluff, and their use was planned as part
of the British invasion of the south. On December 5, 1841,
Cochrane and Major General John Keane issued a proclamation
to the Indians asserting that the war aims of the British included
“the restoration of those lands of which the People of Bad Spirit
have basely robbed them [the Indians]” which was to act as a
clarion call for battle. 72 The Indians were to harrass the
Georgian frontier and to link up with Admiral George Cockburn,
who was operating upon the Atlantic seaboard against Florida
and Georgia, while Cochrane himself struck at New Orleans.
Later, in February, it was envisaged that they might act in a
diversionary role by attacking Fort Stoddert on the Tombigbee
River and threatening Mobile. Unfortunately, although, as late
as January 1815, Prospect Bluff was strengthened by the addition
of two long sixes and a company of the West India Regiment,
the forces there were used in a fragmentary and ineffective
manner. During the period November to February, fifty Mikasukis moved south to attack the frontier, Woodbine tried to
make contact to the northeast with Cockburn, Nicolls took fewer
than 100 Seminole, Creek, and Choctaw warriors to participate
in the abortive British attack upon New Orleans, and some men
were sent towards Mobile to cooperate with General John
Lambert’s troops there. Nothing of importance was achieved by
any of these parties. 73 Worse still, the major British invasion
of the south misfired. In December and January General Edward
Pakenham’s army was disastrously defeated at New Orleans, and
71. Bartholomew to Cochrane, January 31, 1815, ibid., 142; Rawlins to
Cochrane, December 21, 1814, ibid., 122.
72. Cochrane and John Keane, proclamation to the Indians, December 5,
1814, WO/1/143/159.
73. Cochrane to John Lambert, February 3, 1815, ADM/1/508/566-69;
Cochrane, February 14, 1815, ibid., 535-38; Nicolls to Cochrane, December 3, 1814, CP, 2328, 117-18; Bartholomew to Cochrane, January 31,
1815, ibid., 143.
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while Cockburn raided the coasts in January, and Lambert’s
force captured Fort Bowyer the following month, no major
progress had been made before hostilities between Britain and
the United States finally came to an end.
At the close of the War of 1812, therefore, the Indian service
with the British had been singularly unsuccessful. Large numbers
of Seminoles and Red Sticks had assembled to fight their
American foes, and although they had loyally accepted British
direction, they were witness to a series of reverses: the repulse at
Mobile, the loss of Pensacola, and the rout at New Orleans. The
warriors themselves had hardly been in battle, and their losses
were trivial. “I have had 4, 8, and 13 of them killed in different
affairs,” wrote Nicolls more than a year later.74 In February 1815,
the Americans may have appeared far from secure, but they had
preserved their control of the south, and in such circumstances
the Seminoles and the Red Sticks could expect little support from
the other Indians who were more amenable to the United States.
At best, the nativists could claim to have been rescued from
distress and to have received food and arms. But their lands
were still in the hands of their enemies, and their ability to
maintain their independence was almost as precarious as it had
been before the British arrived. Nevertheless, there were still
those promises made by Cochrane that the Creeks would not be
forgotten in the event of peace. If the British had failed the
Indians militarily, it remained to be seen if, by diplomacy, their
pledges could be fulfilled.
When Admiral Cochrane had first written in June 1814 to
Whitehall, arguing that the Indians should be included in a
peace, he was preaching to the converted. As early as August
29, 1812, General Isaac Brock, who owed so much to Tecumseh
and his followers in the campaign which saved Canada from
invasion that year, had urged the British government to protect
his Indian allies in peace negotiations, and by the end of 1812 he
had obtained from Earl Bathurst, colonial secretary, a promise
to that effect. The lesson was reinforced by the Canadian fur
trade interest. It agitated for the preservation of Indian hegemony
over the lands of the lakes and the northwest which would
afford the traders, access to that prime hunting area. In 1814,
when the war in Europe ended, such ideas seemed feasible;
74. Nicholls to Cochrane, March 1, 1816, WO/1/144/139-42.
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Britain would be free to concentrate its resources towards a
military victory sufficient to warrant the imposition upon the
United States of a settlement that would protect the Indian
lands. Catching this mood, in May and June interested parties
clamoured in the British press for the creation of an Indian
buffer state in the northwest.75
However, Viscount Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary,
was in no position to ask prolonged military operations of a
war- and tax-weary Britain. While he hoped that the 1814
campaigns would weaken the hand of the United States, he
feared that an extensive war would raise opposition to his
government at home. Moreover, he had, of course, little if any
commitment to the Indian cause. Nevertheless, he instructed
his three commissioners negotiating with the American diplomats
at Ghent to insist “as a sine qua non of peace” upon “an adequate
arrangement” of Indian interests. This, he suggested, might be
obtained by both Britain and the United States guaranteeing
“the Indian possessions as they shall be established upon the
peace, against encroachment on the part of either state,” thus
creating between Canada and the United States a buffer which
would reduce, he believed, tension between the two countries.76
The Americans were, naturally, astonished by such suggestions
when the peace negotiations opened in Ghent in August 1814,
and the British commissioner, Henry Goulburn, coupled the
idea of the barrier state with the sine qua non. Indeed, as late
as January 1814, James Monroe had been proposing his own
solution to British and American friction over the Indians by
means of a British cession of Canada.77 By August, the Americans
75. Isaac Brock to Liverpool, August 29, 1812, William Wood, ed., Select
British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, 4 vols. (Toronto,
1920-28) I, ,506-09; Brock to George Prevost, September 18, 1812, ibid.,
592-94; George Clifford Chalou, “The Red Pawns Go to War: BritishAmerican-Indian Relations, 1810-1815” (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1971), 139, 188-89; Bradford Perkins, Castlereagh and Adams:
England and the United States, 1812-1823 (Berkeley, 1964), 64, 82-84;
Charles M. Gates, “The West in American Diplomacy, 1812-1815,”
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXVI (March 1940), 502; Fred L.
Engelman, The Peace of Christmas Eve (London, 1962).
76. Castlereagh to William Adams, Lord James Gambier, and Henry Goulburn, July 28, 1814, Charles W. Vane, ed., Correspondence, Despatches
and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of
Londonderry, 12 vols. (London, 1848-54), X, 67-72.
77. Monroe to the American commissioners, January 28, 1814, James P.
Hopkins and Mary W. M.. Hargreaves, eds., The Papers of Henry Clay,
5 vols. (Lexington, 1959-63), I, 857-62.
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were on the defensive, but their commissioners undoubtedly
considered the idea of an Indian barrier state, which would pose
a threat to the expansion of the United States, as preposterous.
It would restore to the Indians a recognition of their sovereignty over the lands they occupied, and it would impeach
American jurisdiction over the northwestern territory, concepts
satisfactorily conceded to the advantage of the United States by
the British in 1783. Moreover, since the Americans were determined to settle the northwest, the creation of the barrier state
would amount to a virtual cession of territory by the United
States. As described by Goulburn on August 9, the Indian land
would not be alienable either to Britain or the United States, and
Castlereagh was persuaded to consider the Greenville treaty
line of 1795 as a basis for discussion of boundaries. Although
the American diplomats lacked instructions which would enable
them to deal with the matter, they expressed contempt for the
British proposals. Henry Clay, one of the American commissioners, referred to “the absurdity, to say the least of it, of Great
Britain attempting, without powers, to treat for savage tribes,
scattered over our acknowledged territory, the very names of
which she probably does not know.“78
On August 25 the American commissioners rejected the
conditions of the Indian buffer state and British control of the
lakes, leaving Britain with the alternatives of climbing down
over the Indian issues or of risking what Castlereagh termed an
“imprudent” military campaign.79 Lord Liverpool, the British
prime minister, doubted that his government could guarantee
inalienable Indian lands, since the tribes themselves might wish
to sell territory to the United States. Concerned that the peace
negotiations would be ruptured, he suggested a modification
to the sine qua non which established it in its final form.80 It
would certainly have been difficult to justify to the British public
the maintenance of the war on a question so remote to them as
the fate of the American Indian. Sir James Mackintosh, for one,
expressed agreement with the Americans, and stated in the
78.

Henry Clay to Monroe, August 18, 1814, ibid., 962-68; Castlereagh to
the British commissioners, August 14, 1814, Vane, Papers of Castlereagh,
X, 86-91.
79. Castlereagh to Lord Liverpool, August 28, 1814, ibid., 100-02.
80. Liverpool to Henry Bathurst, September 14, 15, 30, 1814, Francis
Bickley, ed., Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst (London,
1923), 286-89, 294-95.
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House of Commons that it was impossible to contemplate prohibiting land sales “from the savages.” It would, he suggested,
“arrest the progress of mankind” and “condemn one of the most
favoured tracts of the earth to perpetual sterility.” His views
were similar to those of one of the American commissioners,
John Quincy Adams.81
Article 9 of the final treaty was the crucial item. “The United
States of America,” it read, “engage to put an end, immediately
after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all
the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be at war
at the time of such ratification, and, forthwith, to restore to such
tribes or nations respectively, all the possessions, rights and
privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in
1811, previous to such hostilities. Provided always that such tribes
or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the
United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon
the ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such tribes
or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.“82 Its implications for
the southern Indians were evident, even though the British
diplomats envisaged that they were working on the behalf of
the northern tribes alone. The Treaty of Fort Jackson of August
9, 1814, had already been declared by the nativists and the
Spaniards to be null. Now, by international treaty, the United
States also invalidated Jackson’s dispossession of the Creeks,
since, by Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent, the Indians were to
be restored “all the possessions, rights and privileges which they
may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 1811.”
Cochrane received news of the peace in February 1815, but
he remained ready to resume operations if the treaty was not
ratified. On February 14 he wrote Nicolls, requesting him to
advise the Indians to cease hostilities and await the consummation of the treaty and the consequent restoration of their lands.
Various precautions were, in the meantime, to be taken to ensure
the safety of the Indians at Apalachicola. The munitions,
presents, and stores were to be turned over to them, and the
warriors might be permitted to retain the field guns if they
considered them necessary for their defense. Nicolls’s marines,
81. Parliamentary Debates (London, 1815), XXX, 529-30; Allan Nevins, ed.,
The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (New York, 1951), 131, 133.
8 2 . Parliamentary Debates, XXX, 216-17.
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the coloured colonial marines, and the company of the 5th
West India Regiment at the Bluff were not to be withdrawn
until the peace was finally concluded. In addition, General
Lambert was asked to place a British regiment and two more
West India regiments at Apalachicola, and the ships were to
remain in support.83 In March additional supplies of corn were
sent to the Indians in the Norge and the Meteor. That military
campaigning was not yet considered inconceivable is indicated
by a scale of allowances devised only a little before this time
to provide inducements to the Indian chiefs.84
The Indians and some of the British seem to have been
sufficiently naive to believe that the Americans would restore
the lands “ceded” in 1814, but from this delusion they were
rapidly awakened. On April 28, 1815, Nicolls, who had remained
at Apalachicola after the troops were withdrawn, felt obliged to
protest to the American agent, Benjamin Hawkins. He enclosed
a copy of Article 9 and complained that a few days previously a
number of Americans had attacked a Seminole town of Chief
Bowlegs, killing a man and wounding another, and stealing
cattle. The Indians, however, had refrained from any acts
hostile to the United States, and, indeed, had resolved to communicate with the Americans as little as possible. Consequently,
Nicolls warned the latter not to encroach upon Indian territory
or to communicate directly with the natives, and to evacuate
the lands Jackson had sequestered as guaranteed by Article 9. To
emphasize the point, Nicolls enclosed an Indian pledge, signed
by Hopoeth Mico, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico, in which
the Indians, declaring themselves “a free and independent
people,” gave their promise to abide by the treaty.85
Unfortunately, Nicolls’s tone was likely to aggravate rather
than to placate the American temper, and his letter was treated
83. Cochrane to Nicolls, February 14, 1815, ADM/1/508/531-32; Cochrane,
February 17, 1815, ibid., 556-61; Cochrane to Pulteney Malcolm, February 17, 1815, ibid., 562-63; Cochrane to John Lambert, February 17, 1815,
ibid., 564-66.
84. Malcolm to Nicolls, March 5, 1815, Foreign Office Papers, Public Record
Office, Kew, England (hereinafter cited as FO), class 5/folio 139/p. 181;
Cochrane, instructions to Nicolls, March 9, 1815, ibid., 185; Scale of
Allowances Proposed to be Given to the Indians when Assembled to
Aid in Operations against the United States, 1815, CP, 2330, 171a.
85. Nicolls to Hawkins, April 28, 1815, WO/1/143/161-62; pledge of
Hopoeth Mico, Cappachamico, and Hopoy Mico, April 2, 1815,
FO/5/139/187.
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with derision. Hawkins commented that the Indian signers were
Seminoles, not Creeks, rather speciously, since the former tribe
had lost lands on the lower Chattahoochee and the Flint as a
result of the Fort Jackson treaty, and Jackson himself resented
the continued interference of the British agents and the “bare
faced effrontery” of the letter. As a result, Nicolls again wrote
Hawkins on May 12, complaining that while one of the Indians
had executed a tribesman for stealing cattle belonging to the
United States, Chief Bowlegs’s village had once more been
attacked by American filibusters, and two people had been
murdered. Notwithstanding, he continued, he had the previous
day arranged for four chiefs in different parts of the Indian
country to be designated upholders of the law and to accept
responsibility for its maintenance. In view of this, the Americans
should evacuate the lands of the Indians according to the Ghent
treaty. More antagonistic was the tactless announcement by
Nicolls that he had furnished the Indians with arms and ammunition for their defense and had prepared an offensive and
defensive treaty between Britain and the chiefs which was to be
taken to London for ratification.86
The new “treaty” was an attempt to provide for the needs
of both Nicolls and the Indians, and it proclaimed also its value
to British interest generally. With the war over, Nicolls faced the
prospect of unemployment with half pay, and he had neither
received his salary for the last year nor a confirmation of the
pay and allowances offered him by Cochrane when he was appointed to the provincial rank of colonel of the colonial regiment.
Furthermore, service with the Indians had enjoined severe expenses which had eroded Nicolls’s personal resources. The cost
of his entertainment of leading chiefs alone, up to December 7,
1814, had amounted to $1,952, of which Cochrane had repaid
$500 in February 1815. As late as August of that year, however,
Nicolls was in debt to the extent of £442. To banish these embarrassments, he hoped to remain in the south as an Indian
superintendent, representing British interests, and, from the
confiscated land formerly occupied by Forbes and Company, to
administer a profitable Indian trade.87
86. Jackson to Hawkins, August 14, 1815, Bassett, Correspondence of
Jackson, II, 214-15; Nicolls to Hawkins, May 12, 1815, WO/1/143/165-66.
87. Nicolls to Bathurst, May 5, 1817, WO/1/144/417-18; Nicolls, Memorial,
ibid., 419-22; expenses enclosed in Nicolls to John Barrow, August 21,
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The treaty was drafted at the British fort on the junction
of the Chattahooche and Flint rivers on March 10, 1815, and
signed by thirty chiefs, including Hopoeth Mico, Hopoy Mico,
Cappachamico, and Francis. The Forbes grants were declared
invalid, and the British were asked to provide trade through,
the Alabama, Apalachicola, and St. Marys rivers. The Indians
swore obedience to the British, and denounced sales of native
land without British consent. They offered to grant territory
to any subjects of Britain sent to stay with them. The chiefs
promised to “do our best to protect and defend them in their
lands and property.“88
There can be no doubt that the chiefs feared the loss of
British support, especially as famine, accentuated by the large
numbers of Red Stick refugees in Seminole country, was still
present. The document also drew attention to some of their
earlier grievances predating the Creek war of 1813, such as the
wagon road blazed through the Indian land from Hartford,
Georgia, to Mobile, and the activities of Creek Chief William
McIntosh. The latter, the Indians stated, had been sent by the
Creeks to remonstrate with the Americans over the road and
the encroachments upon the Tombigbee, Coosa, and Alabama
rivers, but he had been bribed and had sold a large tract about
the Oconee and the Ocmulgee rivers to the United States.89
Nicolls had shown little discretion in detailing the trade agreement to Hawkins, because the Treaty of Fort Jackson, which the
Indians considered anulled, had itself been concocted as a device
to separate the Creeks, by a land cession, from interference by
the Spaniards. To demand the restoration of those territories
and in the same breath to provide further evidence for the
necessity of the cession was the ultimate folly. Couched in such
a truculent manner, and furnishing further grounds for suspicion
of the Indians, Nicolls’s communications only served to reinforce
the political expediency of the Treaty of Fort Jackson, and the
Americans found it convenient to ignore Article 9.
After one more attempt to protest at the running of the Fort
Jackson line, Nicolls, accompanied by Francis, his son, his in1815, WO/1/143/123-27; Nicolls to Barrow, August 24, 1815, ibid., 13133; Wright, “Note on First Seminole War,” 570-71.
88: Indian agreement, March 10, 1815, WO/1/143/147-50.
89. Ibid., William McIntosh was concerned in a land cession to the United
States in 1805.
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terpreter, and his servant, who had been deputized by the Indians
to place their complaints before the British government and to
give a calumet of peace to the prince regent, left for England.
Early in August Nicolls installed the Indians at his home,
Durham Lodge, near Eltham, Kent, and then hurried to London,
where he arrived on the evening of August 14. He solicited an
interview with Bathurst, but there was little response apart
from an order from the earl that some pistols be presented to
Chief Francis for his trouble. In a detailed letter, Nicolls explained that the chief had been delegated to present a communication to the British government on behalf of the southern
Indians. Various needs of the natives were articulated, including
winter clothing for the visitors, the desire for an Indian trade
and a communication line with the British in the West Indies
through Apalachicola, and the wish of Francis that his son remain in England to receive an education. Probably hoping to
invoke ministerial responsibility, it was stated that before the
Creek war the Red Sticks had obtained from the governor of
Canada a letter urging them to commence the war but that
none could read it.90
It appears that Nicolls was also canvassing for monetary rewards; according to a memorial to Bathurst, in which he itemized
the remuneration which the leading chiefs and agents should
receive. Hopoeth Mico, “the young king of the Four Nations,”
he hoped, would be awarded £300 and the half pay of a major,
£146 per annum. This last perquisite should also be bestowed
upon Cappachamico and the Mikasuki, Hopoy Mico. Francis
and Talmuchees Hadjo (presumably McQueen) were each worth
£300 and the half pay of a captain, £95.16.3 per annum. Pensions
of £63.17.6 per annum, the half pay of a lieutenant, it was
suggested, should be assigned to each of six other chiefs, and to
First Lieutenant William Hambly of the Colonial Battalion of
Black Marines, head interpreter, and to Lieutenant Castle. Nine
other interpreters should each receive £40 and Woodbine,
£95.16.3 a year. Finally, rewards of 5,831 each of hoes, axes, and

90. Nicolls to Hawkins, June 12, 1815, WO/1/143/151; Nicolls to John
Philip Morier, September 25, 1815, ibid., 137-39; expenses of Nicolls;
ibid., 141; Nicolls to John Wilson Croker, August 15, 1815, ibid., 103;
Nicolls to Bathurst, August 1815, ibid., 107-08.
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knives were requested for the Indians and the issuance of a
license for regular trade.91
To these appeals the government turned a deaf ear, although
on March 12, 1816, Cochrane himself wrote in support of the
Creeks, highlighting the disparity between the Fort Jackson and
Ghent treaties, and explaining that he had not known of the
former agreement when Captain Robert Cavendish Spencer
had finally withdrawn the troops. The Red Sticks, he stated,
could not be bound by a treaty they had not signed. Eventually,
in the early summer of 1816, Francis did obtain an interview
with Bathurst. He was accompanied by one Faden as interpreter, since Nicolls was ill, but received little more than
sympathy. Although the chief received handsome presents during
his visit, the central aims of his mission had been frustrated.92
Fired as he was by an almost fanatical hatred of Americans, he
could not induce the British government to enforce the stipulations made on behalf of the Indians in the Treaty of Ghent, nor
bring them to underwrite the establishment of a permanent
British trade with the southern Indians which would have
enabled them to remain independent of the United States. The
shallow altruism which had characterized the cabinet’s Indian
policy was at last exposed, and further attempts by Francis to
obtain a hearing do not appear to have been successful. Nicolls
fared the worse for the visit, for he entertained the Indians at his
house during the whole period of their stay in England at great
personal expense, and he was compelled eventually to memorialize the treasury for relief from a debt of £378.2.6 in 1817.93
Francis did not, however, sail for the West Indies until DeNicolls, Memorial to Bathurst, 1815, CP, 2575, 120-21.
Cochrane to Bathurst, March 12, 1816, ibid., 140-41; Nicolls to Cochrane,
July 26, 1816, ibid., 157; letter to Henry Goulburn, May 13, 1816,
WO/1/144/263. A list of presents considered suitable for the Indians
(ibid., 21-28) refers to two ploughs and two harrows in addition to
numerous agricultural and domestic utensils, blankets, and cotton. Some
of these items, axes, spades, shovels, scythes, hammers, grindstones, rakes,
hoes, and nails, were shipped out for Francis, according to J. Barker to
George Harrison, January 2, 1817, ibid., 409. In addition the three
Indian delegates received suits, sabres, dirks, rifles, and a few agricultural
and household instruments while they were in London (Nicolls, expenses, WO/1/143/141).
93. William Pole to Bathurst, August 16, 1816, WO/l/144/309-10; Nicolls to
Bathurst, enclosing memorial, May 5, 1817, ibid., 417-22. Francis’s
attitude is revealed in Nicolls, December 19, 1815, CP, 2328, 182, which
states: “He (Francis) sweares he will kill every American in the province
as soon as he returns.”

91.
92.
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cember 30, 1816. In September of that year, when he was preparing to leave, Nicolls attempted to retrieve more from the
visit by requesting Bathurst to supply funds for the education
of the chief’s son in England, and eventually he managed to procure a sum of £100 which was to be given to Francis by Governor
Cameron at New Providence. 94 The Creek’s ensuing departure
marked a further retreat of the British on the matter of the
Indian allies, and the point was underlined by the cabinet responses to protests lodged by Indians at Apalachicola even before
Francis had left London. Early in 1816 a memorial, allegedly
from some of the head chiefs of the Choctaw, Creek, and Cherokee, was sent to Cameron pleading for British interference in
the question of their rights as guaranteed by the peace. Significantly, the three signers included, at last, the leaders of the
hitherto pro-American Creek faction, including Big Warrior
(Tustennuggee Thlucko) and Little Prince. Bathurst seemed
disposed to act upon the complaint. He forwarded it to the
foreign office, observing that the Indians possessed a claim to
British intervention, and he instructed Governor Cameron to
inform the Indians that the British minister in Washington would
raise the matter with the United States.95
Nothing, apparently, was done, however, and the inactivity
brought two Indian deputies to the Bahamas in January 1817,
reporting that the Americans had destroyed the fort at Prospect
Bluff and were building posts upon Indian land, while the
warriors lacked muskets, ammunition, and British help. Although their message was passed through the usual channels to
the foreign office, neither it nor further representations of the
Indians for a trade with the West Indies or even the removal
of the Creeks to another British colony appear to have
96
accomplished anything. With the refusal of the British to
uphold the provisions made for the Indians in the Treaty of

94.
95.
96.

Nicolls to Goulburn, December 21, 1816, WO/1/144/399-400; Nicolls to
Goulburn, January 7, 1817, ibid., 403-04; Nicolls, September 24, 1816,
ibid., 347-48; Bathurst to Cameron, January 11, 1817, FO/5/127/151.
Cameron to Bathurst, March 23, 1816, ibid., 142-44; Goulburn to
William Hamilton, May 17, 1816., ibid., 145; Bathurst to Cameron,
June 8, 1816, ibid., 147.
Indian chiefs, December 19, 1816, ibid., 157-58; Cameron to Bathurst,
January 10, 1817, ibid., 153; Goulburn to Hamilton, June 26, 1817,
ibid., 155.
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Ghent, the War of 1812 among the southern Indians may be
said to have come to an end.
British promises to the Indians that their rights would not be
ignored in the event of a peace had come to nothing. At the
time of the so-called first Seminole war of 1818 a final appeal
was made to the British through Alexander Arbuthnot, a trader
from Nassau, New Providence, then residing with the southern
Indians. According to the wishes of the chiefs, especially “King
Hatchy,” but presumably also Francis, who “has been called by
his people to put himself at their head” and was camped “at
Spanish Bluff” with 1,000 to 1,200 men, mainly Red Sticks,
word was sent to Cameron, Charles Bagot, and Nicolls that the
Indians were in desperate need of assistance.97 Nicolls, in particular, was stung by the American execution shortly afterwards
of his “noble” friend Francis, and he tried hard to persuade
his government to intercede on behalf of the natives but without
success.98 For the cabinet the affair became nothing more than
another passing incident.
In resigning their interest in the Indian problem, the British
signalled the passing of aboriginal America east of the Mississippi.
The expansion of the United States could have been arrested
only by a bulwark of overwhelming power, one which, conceivably, only the British, with the aid of large numbers of
Indians, would have been capable of establishing. Without
Britain’s aid, Indian confederacies could not hold the west; their
efforts to do so were gallant, but futile. Within a few decades,
in both the north and the south, the remnants of the once-proud
tribes were dispossessed and removed to areas west of the
Mississippi.
It is possible that the dispossession of these Indians might have
been deferred had Britain and her native allies enjoyed greater
military fortune in the War of 1812. In the northwest, Tecumseh
and his warriors had helped contain the American offensive for
over a year with few British troops to support them, while in
the south the Creeks had employed thousands of American
soldiers before their defeat at Horseshoe Bend in March 1814. In
both theatres, the principal nativist strength had been broken
before the arrival of the major British forces in 1814. Had the
97.
98.

Alexander Arbuthnot to Nicolls, January 30, 1818, FO/5/139/203-04.
Nicolls, June 27, 1818, ibid., 173.
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maximum Indian and British power in the north and the south
coincided, and greater success attended some of their efforts, it is
possible that a defeat of sufficient magnitude might have been
inflicted upon the Americans to have at least delayed the dispossession of the Indians.
The result, in the final reckoning, would have been the
same. It is true that many of the British officers had learned to
like and sympathize with the Indians, men such as General Isaac
Brock, the Indian agent Matthew Elliot, Cochrane, Nicolls, and
Woodbine, the men who knew them best. But no nation would,
of course, have been prepared to commit the resources that
would have been necessary to preserve the Indian homelands, not
even Britain, which owed so much to the natives for the defense
of Canada. The British, no less than the Americans, adhered
to the principles of economic and population growth and
territorial expansion which had no place for aboriginal America.
Given the proximity of the aggressive nations of America and
Europe, bent upon fulfilling “manifest destiny,” the Indian
might, briefly, be able to capitalize upon international rivalries
to his advantage, but the ultimate preservation of his homeland
was not possible.
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